



# REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CLUSTER MUNITIONS CONVENTION

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## BEIRUT - LEBANON


### 11-12 NOV 2008

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UN Chief of Operations  
MACCSL  
LEBANON

**“Particular Challenges of  
Coordinating the diverse group of  
National & International Actors”  
post 2006 Lebanon War**

# The United Nations System

## Principal Organs



**NOTES:** Solid lines from a Principal Organ indicate a direct reporting relationship; dashes indicate indirect reporting relationships.

<sup>1</sup> The UN Drug Control Programme is part of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

<sup>2</sup> UNRISD and UNIDIR report only to the GA.

<sup>3</sup> UNRWA and UNRIF report only to the GA.


<sup>4</sup> In an exceptional arrangement, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support reports directly to the UN Secretary-General.

<sup>5</sup> WEA reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly (GA).


<sup>6</sup> The CIBTO Prep Com and OPCW report to the GA.

<sup>7</sup> Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations working with the UN and each other through the intergovernmental level, and through the Chief Executive Board for coordination (CEB) at the inter-agency level.

<sup>8</sup> UNFIP is an autonomous trust fund operating under the leadership of the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General.



# The “National & International Response”



**How do we Coordinate this?**

# Government of HOST country

- Primary responsibility for safety, security and well being of own citizens
- Responsibility for protection of IDPs within its borders
- Responsibility for safety and security of humanitarian workers and other expatriates
- Responsible for maintaining law and order
- Right to extend or deny admission
- Cooperate with international agencies
- Facilitate coordination
- **SOVEREIGNTY**

# The first to respond?



Affected  
People



**Municipalities**

**Community  
Groups**

**Local Community  
Emergency  
Teams**

**-Civil Defense**

**-Red Cross**



# First Response to a Crisis?



# Immediate Post War Problems (Aug/Sep 2006)

- Initial scope and extent of the cluster bomb problem and impact was unknown
- Mobilizing the required expertise to deal with the submunitions problem
- Mobilization of suitable BAC clearance assets to meet the demand
- Lack of specialist equipment
- Lack of and mobilization of suitable vehicles
  - Diesel vehicles not allowed into country
- Importation & customs clearances of specialist equipment & vehicles

# Immediate Post War Problems (Aug/Sep 2006)

- Complex environment, military/armed elements still in area
- Time constraints
- Media Control
- Communication of MRE to Civilians & Agencies
- Duplication of relief effort
- Allocation & Duplication of EOD/BAC Taskings
- Location / Accommodation of Agencies



# Immediate Post War Problems (Aug/Sep 2006)

- Lacked Trained Personnel
- Security Clearance & Visa's for staff
  - National Staff
  - International Staff
- Security of International personnel

# Immediate Post War Coordination (Aug - Dec 2006)

- Communications
  - Radio VHF/UHF
  - Mobile Telephone
  - Language
- Meeting other agency requirements/needs
- Access and freedom of movement, route clearance priority 1
- MACCSL Community Liaison Team escorts for aid convoys, assessment teams & media
- Situation / Security Briefings (Daily)
- Timely dissemination of information regarding hazards/threat (Daily)

# Immediate Post War Coordination (Aug – Dec 2006)

- Influx of returnee civilian population
- Clearance of vital infrastructure to assist aid agencies and civilians
- Military / Civilian cooperation
  - UNIFIL
  - LAF
  - NGO's
  - Govt. Org
  - Other Aid Agencies
  - Reconstruction Agencies



# Continuing Coordination Challenges (2007 - 2008)

- Demand from civilian population to return to using agricultural land
- Demand for infrastructures to be demolished to allow rebuilding
- Complex environment, many actors with varying demands
- Varying mandates, capacities & operating norms

# Continuing Coordination Challenges (2007 - 2008)

- Lack of operating standards
- Lack of proper reporting procedures to capture hazard information
- Constructive communication between actors to focus and implement main efforts where required
- Prioritization of clearance to meet local and national needs
- Funding

# Key Lessons Learnt

- Centralized Initial Command & Control is vital
- Inter Agency communications is essential at all levels (HQ & Field)
- Creates challenges for coordination...but equally opportunities for more effective response
- Humanitarian Reform/Cluster approach: an interagency effort to improve quality, predictability and accountability of humanitarian services

# Summary

- ◉ Coordination of resources and aid efforts in the aftermath of any conflict is difficult at the best of times and it is essential that all actors collaborate and work together to address the immediate threat to the local population.
- ◉ Keep the needs of beneficiaries as the primary focus!
- ◉ All aid efforts combined saved lives !



**THANK YOU**